Tài liệu learning large lesson pdf

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iii
Preface
U.S. post–Cold War military operations have witnessed a shift in the
relative roles of ground power and air power in warfighting, but the joint
warfighting potential of this shift is not being fully realized. is is the
hypothesis of a larger report, Learning Large Lessons: e Evolving Roles
of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post–Cold War Era, by David
E. Johnson (MG-405-1-AF, 2007). is summary of that monograph
contains an abbreviated discussion of four of the cases examined in the
more-comprehensive study: Iraq (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan
(2001), and Iraq (2003). It also incorporates modest changes from the
larger monograph, based on suggestions made to the author since its
publication. Key issues addressed are the dominant roles played by the
services in the development of U.S. joint warfighting doctrine and con-
cepts and the fact that warfighting success does not necessarily achieve
a strategic political end-state that supports U.S. long-term interests.
Specific recommendations include
Shaping the theater operational environment—strategically
and operationally—should be an air component function.
Air power has proven to be capable of performing deep strike
operations, a mission that the Army has long believed the Air
Force could not or would not reliably perform. Furthermore,
the organic systems the Army has to fight the deep battle—the
AH-64 Apache helicopter and the Army Tactical Missile System
(ATACMS)—are not as effective in that role as fixed-wing air-
craft, although they have shown considerable value in other roles.
us, the task of strategically and operationally shaping the the-
•
iv Learning Large Lessons: Executive Summary
ater should be an air component function, and joint and service
doctrines and programs should change accordingly.
e Army should focus more than it currently does on the
central role of ground forces in achieving strategic objectives.
Despite the warfighting prowess of the U.S. military, its forces
have been less effective across the full range of military operations,
e.g., stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.
is realm is largely and intrinsically ground-centric. While the
Army is adapting in real time to the challenges beyond major
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the strategic goals
of these operations have not yet been realized. Given the effec-
tiveness of air power in “deep operations,”
1
perhaps the time has
come to assess whether the Army should be substantially altered
to bolster its effectiveness in the all-important realm of realiz-
ing strategic objectives that go beyond the ability to maneuver
and dominate in major operations. Resources for this redesign
could come in part from existing or envisioned deep operations
capabilities—from across all services—that air power can provide
more effectively.
Much work remains to attain a truly joint American warfight-
ing system, including unskewing the “lessons” from recent conflicts.
Even more work is needed to adapt American warfighting prowess into
capabilities to achieve strategic political objectives. Reform will be dif-
ficult, but it must proceed apace to ensure that the United States has
the capacity to deal with the strategic realities of the 21st century.
e research reported here was sponsored by Dr. Christopher
Bowie, Deputy Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (AF/
1
Terms and definitions continually evolve in U.S. military doctrine and concepts. rough-
out this study, various terms appear—deep operations, deep strike operations, shaping oper-
ations, etc.—to describe the use of fires beyond the range of the indirect fire systems organic
to U.S. Army divisions (and brigade combat teams). e purpose is not to advocate or debate
specific terms and definitions but, rather, to assess which systems and capabilities are most
effective in providing fires and effects for the overall joint force effort throughout a theater of
operations.
•
Preface v
XPX). e work was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine
Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal-year 2004
study, “Fourteen Years of War: Identifying and Implementing Les-
sons from U.S. Military Operations Since the Cold War.” e mono-
graph should interest policymakers in the Department of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and those in
the armed services concerned with concept development, doctrine, and
weapon system acquisition.
RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corpo-
ration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and develop-
ment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with
independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,
employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aero-
space forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Aerospace Force
Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Manage-
ment; and Strategy and Doctrine.
Additional information about PAF is available on our Web site at
http://www.rand.org/paf.

Contents
vii
Preface iii
Tables
xi
Acknowledgments
xiii
Abbreviations
xv
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 1
Study Scope and Methodology
2
Study Scope: e Range of Military Operations and
Focused Learning
2
Study Methodology
3
Organization of is Monograph
5
CHAPTER TWO
e Relationship Between U.S. Ground Power and Air Power
Before the End of the Cold War
7
CHAPTER THREE
Iraq, 1991 15
Background
15
Lessons: e Ground-Centric View
16
Lessons: e Air-Centric View
16
Areas of Ground-Air Tension
17
Who Won the War?
17
viii Learning Large Lessons: Executive Summary
e JFACC 18
Who Owns the Battlespace?
19
e Institutionalization of “Lessons” from the Gulf War
20
Immediate Ground-Centric Gulf War Lessons
20
Immediate Air-Centric Gulf War Lessons
21
e Failure to Create Joint Doctrinal Solutions
21
e Continuing Debate About Who Owns the Battlespace
21
CHAPTER FOUR
Kosovo, 1999 23
Background
23
Ground-Centric View
24
Air-Centric View
26
e Appropriate Use of Air Power
27
Improving Air Power Performance
27
Areas of Ground-Air Tension
28
CHAPTER FIVE
Afghanistan, 2001 31
Background
31
Ground-Centric View: Strategic and Operational Lessons
32
Air-Centric View
33
Ground-Air Tensions and the Tactical Ground-Centric Lessons of
Operation Anaconda
34
CHAPTER SIX
Iraq, 2003 39
Background
39
A Joint Ground-Centric View
40
A Joint Air-Centric View
45
Areas of Ground-Air Tension
47
CHAPTER SEVEN
What Has Been Learned, and What Has Not? 51
e Inadequacies of Joint Doctrine
55
Service Cultures as Constraints to Joint Culture 57
e Army Future Force as a Reflection of Army Culture
59
e Problems with Army Concepts for Deep Operations
61
What Is the Future of Ground Power?
66
e Future Air Force as an Evolving Idea
68
Air Force Culture and Interservice Cooperation
71
e Future of American Warfighting
72
What Should Be Done?
72
Reforms Beyond Warfighting
74
References
77
Contents ix

Tables
xi
1.1. Post–Cold War Conflict Cases 4
7.1. Case Assessment Results
52